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SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this paper is to twofold: to design an alternative reform of the 
Spanish contributory retirement pension system based on optimal strategies 
to restore liquidity through changes in the key variables of the system (the 
contribution rate, retirement age and/or indexation of pensions) and at the 
same time to assess the reformed Spanish system with the focus on its 
liquidity in the long run. These optimal strategies, which we call Automatic 
Balancing Mechanisms (ABMs), calculate the optimal path of these 
variables over time and absorb fluctuations in longevity, fertility rates, life 
expectancy, salary growth or any other kind of uncertainty faced by the 
pension system. 
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RESUMEN 
 
El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. En primer lugar se diseña una reforma 
alternativa en el sistema español de pensiones contributivas de jubilación, 
basada en técnicas de optimización, para restablecer el equilibrio financiero 
minimizando los cambios en las principales variables del sistema como el 
tipo de cotización, la edad de jubilación y la revalorización de las pensiones. 
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A continuación se valora si la reforma actual del sistema de pensiones 
garantiza la liquidez del sistema en el largo plazo. La estrategia óptima 
diseñada, a la que llamamos mecanismo financiero de ajuste automático 
(MFA), identifica la trayectoria óptima de las variables y absorbe las 
fluctuaciones en la longevidad, las tasas de fecundidad, esperanza de vida, el 
crecimiento del salario o cualquier otro acontecimiento aleatorio que afecte 
al sistema de pensiones.  
 
JEL: E62, H55, J11, J26. 
 
Palabras clave: Equilibrio financiero, España, Pensiones públicas, 
Optimización, Reforma, Riesgo, Sistema de reparto. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Public pension systems are usually financed on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
basis where pensions for retirees are paid by the contributions of the 
working-age population. It is well understood that this method of financing 
requires a balance between the benefits paid to the pensioners and the 
contributions made by the active workers. 
 
The decline in fertility rates, the increase in longevity and the current 
forecasts for the ageing of the baby-boom generation all point to a 
substantial increase in the age dependency ratio, and this will raise serious 
concerns for the sustainability of PAYG pension systems. This is a 
worldwide problem, and many European countries have already carried out 
some parametric reforms of their systems in the sense that promises of 
payment may be reasonably respected. For example in Italy the normal 
retirement age has increased from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 60 
for women while the indexation of pension payments has been modified 
in order to reduce their rate of increase. Germany has also introduced 
penalties for early retirement 3 . As stated in Holzmann et al. (2003), 
countries such as Sweden, Poland, Italy and Latvia have undertaken 
some structural reforms by changing the formula to calculate their 
initial pension from a Defined Benefit (DB) to a Notional Defined-
Contribution (NDC) pension system4.  
                                                 
3 Detailed pension reforms for European countries can be found in Whiteford and Whitehouse 
(2006).  
4 According to Holzmann et al. (2012), many countries, including Egypt, China and Greece, are 
seriously considering the introduction of NDCs. 
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In the meantime, some countries, such as, Sweden, Germany and Japan, 
have decided to set up an automatic balance mechanism (ABM). This 
has been defined as a set of predetermined measures established by law 
to be applied immediately as required according to an indicator that 
reflects the financial health of the system (Vidal-Meliá et al. 2009 and 
2010). Its purpose, through successive application, is to re-establish the 
financial equilibrium of PAYG pension systems without the repeated 
intervention of the legislator. Turner (2009) found that at least 12 
countries have the indexation of benefits linked to life expectancy or 
some other kind of automatic adjustment5.  
 
Spain is not an exception to the pension crisis and concerns about the 
financial sustainability of the pension system have driven reforms 
enacted in recent years. In 2060, there will be fewer than two people of 
active-age per retiree compared to more than three currently while life 
expectancy at the retirement age will have increased from 16.5 to 20.8. 
There are many debates regarding the effectiveness of the Spanish 
reforms and lot of researchers, Vidal-Meliá (2014), De la Fuente and 
Doménech (2013), state that the 2011 reform that introduced parametric 
changes and the commitment to a sustainability factor by 2027 is not 
sufficient.  According to Vidal-Meliá (2014) the 2011 reform preserves 
the structure of the pre-reform formula for calculating the initial 
retirement pension and reproduces most of its main flaws. Responding 
to the strong pressures from the European Commission, the Spanish 
Committee of Experts designed and introduced a new indexation on 
pensions (annual revaluation factor), to be implemented from the 
beginning of 2014, and sustainability factor6 (intergenerational equity 
factor) for the pension system to be implemented in 2019 with the aim 
of reducing spending on pensions. 
 
To our knowledge, the Spanish pension system reform does not have any 
mathematical basis other than trying to adapt the system to the demographic 
scenario, without any proof, based on the general view that indicators, such 
as the old-age dependency ratio, expenditure on pensions or life expectancy, 
will rise over time. With this in mind, the aim of this paper is to twofold. 
First, it seeks to design an alternative reform of the Spanish pension system, 
different to the ones proposed in Act 27/2011 and Act 23/2013, based on 
optimal strategies, that not only adapts the system to economic and 
demographic changes with a mathematical basis but also restores liquidity to 
                                                 
5 For more information on ABMs see, for instance, Turner (2007) (2009), Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009) and 
OECD (2012). 
6 For more information on the new indexation on pensions and sustainability factor see Act 23/2013. 
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the Spanish pension system through changes in the contribution rate, 
retirement age and/or indexation of pensions. Secondly, it assesses the 
reformed Spanish system (Act 27/2011) with the focus on its financial 
equilibrium in the long run. These optimal strategies, which we call 
Automatic Balancing Mechanisms7 (ABMs), calculate the optimal path of 
these variables over time and absorb fluctuations in longevity, fertility rates, 
life expectancy, salary growth or any other kind of uncertainty faced by the 
pension system. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents some data on 
the Spanish pension system. The third section describes the main notation, 
definitions and the numerical optimisation method. The fourth section shows 
the practical application of this method to the Spanish pension system and 
suggests how an ABM should be designed, for both symmetric and 
asymmetric cases, to restore liquidity to the system. This section also 
provides a sensitivity analysis of the results. The fifth section focuses on the 
long run and provides an analysis over a 75-year horizon for the Spanish 
pension system. The final section concludes. Three appendices present the 
expressions to calculate the income from contributions and the expenditure 
on pensions; summarise the main automatic balancing mechanism, and; 
provide a detailed description of the formulae to calculate the monthly 
pension benefit before and after the Spanish pension reform. 
 
 
2. Brief description of the Spanish pension system 
 
This paper is focused on the reform of the contributory public social 
insurance programs run by the State and in particular to the old-age (also 
called retirement) contingency8. The retirement contingency is financed by 
contributions from employees and employers. 
 
The key features of the reform are: a) raising the statutory retirement age 
from 65 to 67 over the period 2013-2027, b) lengthening the period used to 
calculate the base pension9 from 15 to 25 years over the period 2013-2022, 
c) increasing the number of contributory years for a full pension from 35 to 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A for characteristics of some countries with ABMs in place. 
8 These programs award benefits to compensate for income no longer earned due to sickness, accident, 
family care responsibilities, unemployment, disability, old age or death. 
9 Also called regulating base. For more details of the calculation see Appendix C. 
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3710 and d) changing the adjustment factors for anticipating the retirement 
age and the incentives for remaining in the labour market11. 
 
At the end of 2013, a reform was passed that establishes a new revaluation 
index and regulates the sustainability factor that complements the parametric 
changes. Under this reform, from 2014, pensions will be adjusted according 
to the performance of variables, such as revenue, expenditure and the 
number of pensions. This will replace the former system, in force since 
1997, which linked pensions to the rate of change of the CPI. Moreover, 
from 2019, starting pensions will be automatically linked to the increase in 
life expectancy (the sustainability factor12). 
 
Table 1 presents the main data on the retirement contingency during the last 
six years. Consequences of the reform are difficult to value at this first stage 
given that the reform will be applied gradually until 2027. It can be seen that 
the actual number of contributors has been decreasing while the number of 
pensioners increases. Thus the number of contributors funding a retirement 
pension falls from 3.87 to 2.98 over the last six years. At the same time the 
monthly benefit and the life expectancy at retirement age increase and this 
worsens the sustainability of the pension system. 
 
Table 1: Some data for the Spanish Pension System (old-age contingency) 
 
Data \ Years 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Number of contributors  
(in thousands) 19,129.81 17,667.47 16,845.86 16,553.79 
Number of retirement 
pensions (in thousands) 4,936.84 5,123.88 5,330.20 5,558.96 
Contributors/retirement 
pension ratio 3.87 3.45 3.16 2.98 
Life expectancy at age 
65 20 20.6 20.5 20.98 
Monthly Average old-
age pension 810.48 883.27 946.32 999.77 
Own source based on www-seg-social.es and www.ine.es 
                                                 
10 Other features regarding the early retirement and voluntary work extension can be consulted in 
Act27/2011. 
11  For particularities or further explanation regarding the reform, please see the Appendix C and 
Act27/2011. 
12 Examination of the sustainability factor (see Act 23/2013) is beyond the scope of this paper whose 
main aim is to shed some light on how variables such as the contribution rate, retirement age and 
indexation on pensions should be modified to re-establish liquidity in the system in the long run. 
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According to Act27/2011, the aim of the reform is to meet the enormous 
challenge posed by an ageing population and to partially correct the 
imbalance between contributions made and pensions received. This paper 
assesses whether the main changes in the reform Act27/2011 are justified 
from a mathematical point of view with the aim to restore the liquidity into 
the system in the long run. The next section designs automatic balancing 
mechanisms to provide an alternative reform and assess the current reform of 
the Spanish pension system on a theoretical basis. 
 
 
3. Liquidity ABMs  
 
In this section two ABMs are built to analyse and restore the liquidity of the 
Spanish contributory retirement pension system, which is financed by the 
PAYG method. These ABMs are based on the work of Godínez-Olivares et 
al. (2015), in which the objective is to minimise changes over time in the 
main variables, such as the contribution rate, normal retirement age and 
indexation of pensions. This mechanism, which uses an intertemporal 
optimisation model, identifies and applies an optimal path for the 
contribution rate, normal retirement age and indexation of pensions to a 
PAYGO system. The first ABM does not include the accumulation or deficit 
of the buffer fund, while the second includes the accumulation or deficit of 
the fund over the time.  The aim of both ABMs is to absorb fluctuations in 
longevity, fertility rates, life expectancy, salary growth or any other random 
events in a pension system. The main purposes of the ABM, through 
successive applications, are to re-establish the financial equilibrium of 
PAYG adapting the system to changes in socio-economic and demographic 
conditions; to create a credible institutional framework to increase the 
likelihood that promises of pension payments will be respected; and to 
minimise the use of the pension system as an electoral tool13.  
 
The functional objective is a logarithmic function which is set to minimise 
the percentage of the changes over time of the key variables. The logarithmic 
function is widely used in statistical forecasting (Nau (2015). Its great 
advantage is that small changes in the natural log of a variable are directly 
interpretable as percentage changes, to a very close approximation, and 
because changes in the natural logarithm are (almost) equal to percentage 
changes in the original series, it follows that the slope of a trend line fitted to 
logged data is equal to the average percentage growth in the original series. 
Godínez-Olivares et al. (2015) introduced the idea of minimising the rate 
                                                 
13 Nevertheless the system still is subject to a kind of political risk in the sense that the planning horizon 
of politicians is much shorter than the horizon of the pension system. 
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change of the decision variables involved in the projections of the 
contribution rate, normal retirement age and indexation of pensions. 
 
The optimisation problem is defined by the objective function: 
 
݂ሺ݀௡, ݊ሻ ൌ ݉݅݊௖೙,௫೙ሺೝሻ,ఒ೙, ൥∑ ൭ߠଵ݈݋݃ ቀ
௖೙శభ
௖೙ ቁ ൅ ߝଵߠଶ݈݋݃ ൬
௫೙శభሺೝሻ
௫೙ሺೝሻ
൰ ൅ே௡ୀଵ
ߝଶߠଷ݈݋݃ ቀఒ೙శభఒ೙ ቁ൱൩                                                                                          (1) 
 
where ܿ௡, is the contribution rate; ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ, is the age of normal retirement; and, ߣ௡ , is the indexation of pensions. ߠ௜, ݅ ൌ 1,2,3  are the weights which 
measure the impact  that occurs when the key variables are projected and 
ߠଵ ൅ ߠଶ ൅ ߠଷ ൌ 1. These weights reflect the interest of the policy maker, 
since, a value of 0 in one parameter means that no change is allowed in this 
particular variable. 
 
A metric problem is present due to the nature of the logarithmic function, as 
ܿ௡ , ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ  and ߣ௡  have different units and constraints. To deal with this 
problem, ߝ௜, ݅ ൌ 1,2 have been introduced in the growth rates of the age of 
normal retirement and in the indexation of pensions.  
 
ߝଵ ൌ ୪୭୥	ሺ௖౴ሻ୪୭୥	ሺ௫౴ሺೝሻሻ and ߝଶ ൌ
୪୭୥	ሺ௖౴ሻ
୪୭୥	ሺఒభ౴ሻ ↿ቄഊ೙శభഊ೙ வ଴ቅ൅
୪୭୥	ሺ௖౴ሻ
୪୭୥	ሺఒమ౴ሻ ↿ቄഊ೙శభഊ೙ ஸ଴ቅ 
 
where ܿ୼, ݔ୼ሺ௥ሻ and ߣଵ୼ are the maximum increase that are allowed (and  ߣଶ୼ 
decrease for ߣ௡ ) per year in the contribution rate ܿ௡ , the age of normal 
retirement ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ and the indexation of pensions ߣ௡; and ↿ሼ௝ఢఠሽ is the indicator 
function14. 
 
The system's liquidity is measured in two ways; first, without the inclusion 
of the buffer fund, that is, only the income from contributions and the 
expenditure of pensions are taking into account; and secondly, the 
accumulation of the buffer fund over time and the actuarial projections of the 
income from contributions and the pensions to be paid are included in the 
liquidity of the system. The following subsections describe the constraints 
set in our optimisation model to build the ABMs. 
 
                                                 
14 The indicator function takes the value of 1 if the condition ݆	߳	߱ is satisfied and 0 in all other cases. 
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3.1  Liquidity ABM without buffer fund 
 
In order built a realistic problem, the following constraints are imposed on 
the Liquidity ABM without buffer fund; for the contribution rate, ܿ௡, the age 
of normal retirement, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ, and the indexation of pensions, ߣ௡, upper (ܿ௠௔௫, 
ݔ௠௔௫ሺ௥ሻ , ߣ௠௔௫ ∈ Թ ) and lower (ܿ௠௜௡ , ݔ௠௜௡ሺ௥ሻ , ߣ௠௜௡ ∈ Թ) bounds are imposed. 
These bounds are set in order to avoid possible unrealistic increases in the 
key variables of the pension system. Another constraint to be considered is 
the smooth constraint. This constraint is necessary to prevent jumps in the 
contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of pensions. 
Mathematically, the smooth constraint is set as:  
 
ܿଵ୼ ൑ ܿ௡ାଵܿ௡ ൑ ܿଶ୼;	ݔଵ୼
ሺ௥ሻ ൑ ݔ௡ାଵ
ሺ௥ሻ
ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ
൑ ݔଶ୼ሺ௥ሻ; ߣଵ୼ ൑
ߣ௡ାଵ
ߣ௡ ൑ ߣଶ୼ 
 
where ܿଵ୼, ܿଶ୼, ݔଵ୼ሺ௥ሻ, ݔଶ୼ሺ௥ሻ, ߣଵ୼, ߣଶ୼ ∈ Թ. 
 
Finally, the liquidity restriction is imposed as: ܿ௡ ௡ܹ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቁ െ
ܤ௡ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ, ߣ௡ቁ ൒ 0. ௡ܹ is the total contribution base15 paid at n and ܤ௡ is 
the total expenditure on pensions at n that depend on the growth of salaries, 
g, the retirement age ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ,	 and the indexation of pensions ߣ௡.  The liquidity 
restriction helps to impose maximum levels of deficit or surplus into the 
system, and setting this restriction greater or equal to zero means that no 
deficit is allowed in the pension system. 
  
The optimisation function to minimise is as follows: 
 
݂ሺ݀௡, ݊ሻ ൌ ݉݅݊௖೙,௫೙ሺೝሻ,ఒ೙, ൥∑ ൭ߠଵ݈݋݃ ቀ
௖೙శభ
௖೙ ቁ ൅ ߝଵߠଶ݈݋݃ ൬
௫೙శభሺೝሻ
௫೙ሺೝሻ
൰ ൅ே௡ୀଵ
ߝଶߠଷ݈݋݃ ቀఒ೙శభఒ೙ ቁ൱൩                                                                                         (2) 
 
 
                                                 
15 See Appendix B for details of calculations for the total contribution base and expenditure on 
pensions. 
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ݏ. ݐ.
ە
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
ۓܿ௠௜௡ ൑ ܿ௡ ൑ ܿ௠௔௫; ݔ௠௜௡ሺ௥ሻ ൑ ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ ൑ ݔ௠௔௫ሺ௥ሻ ; 	ߣ௠௜௡ 	൑ ߣ௡ ൑ ߣ௠௔௫
ܿଵ୼ ൑ ܿ௡ାଵܿ௡ ൑ ܿଶ୼;	ݔଵ୼
ሺ௥ሻ ൑ ݔ௡ାଵ
ሺ௥ሻ
ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ
൑ ݔଶ୼ሺ௥ሻ; ߣଵ୼ ൑
ߣ௡ାଵ
ߣ௡ ൑ ߣଶ୼
ߠଵ ൅ ߠଶ ൅ ߠଷ ൌ 1
ߝଵ ൌ log	ሺܿ୼ሻlog	ሺݔ୼ሺ௥ሻሻ
ߝଶ ൌ log	ሺܿ୼ሻlog	ሺߣଵ୼ሻ ↿ቄഊ೙శభഊ೙ வ଴ቅ൅
log	ሺܿ୼ሻ
log	ሺߣଶ୼ሻ ↿ቄഊ೙శభഊ೙ ஸ଴ቅ
ܿ௡ ௡ܹ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቁ െ ܤ௡ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ, ߣ௡ቁ ൒ 0
 
 
3.2  Liquidity ABM with buffer fund 
 
In this subsection a contingency fund is introduced into the minimisation 
function. It is important to highlight that four papers, Godínez-Olivares et al. 
(2015), Haberman and Zimbidis (2002), Pantelous and Zimbidis (2008), and 
Gannon, Legros and Touzé (2013), propose parametric reforms in the PAYG 
pension systems introducing the concept of a liquidity or contingency fund 
in order to absorb unexpected events that might affect their liquidity.  
Gannon, Legros and Touzé (2013) define this buffer fund as the inter-
temporal budget balance of the pension system that brings promised future 
expenditures in line with expected future revenues. For example, the interest 
generated by the buffer fund in Spain covered the shortfall in contributions 
during 2010 (Vidal-Meliá (2014)).  
 
The liquidity ABM with the buffer fund calculates the optimal path for the 
contribution rate, age of normal retirement and indexation of pensions 
building an optimisation problem that is solved by numerical analysis 
(Godínez-Olivares et al. (2015)) including the dynamics of the fund, ܨ௡, that 
can be expressed as:  
 
																																		ܨ௡ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ ܬ௡ሻܨ௡ିଵ ൅ ܿ௡ ௡ܹ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቁ െ ܤ௡ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ, ߣ௡ቁ                              (3) 
 
where ܬ௡ is the growth risk-free rate of the fund during year n; ܿ௡, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ, ߣ௡ 
are the projected variables during year n; ௡ܹ is the total contribution base 
paid at n; ܤ௡  is the total expenditure on pensions at n.  The derived 
contingency fund is able to absorb fluctuations in longevity, fertility rates, 
salary growth or any other events.  
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In this ABM, the liquidity restriction is changed to,ܨ௡ ൒ 0, that is, ሺ1 ൅
ܬ௡ሻܨ௡ିଵ ൅ ܿ௡ ௡ܹ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቁ ൒ ܤ௡ ቀ݊, ݃, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ, ߣ௡ቁ. The other restrictions set 
for the ABM without buffer fund remains the same. 
 
The optimisation problem to minimise in the ABM including the buffer fund 
is defined by: 
 
݂ሺ݀௡, ݊ሻ ൌ ݉݅݊௖೙,௫೙ሺೝሻ,ఒ೙, ൥∑ ൭ߠଵ݈݋݃ ቀ
௖೙శభ
௖೙ ቁ ൅ ߝଵߠଶ݈݋݃ ൬
௫೙శభሺೝሻ
௫೙ሺೝሻ
൰ ൅ே௡ୀଵ
ߝଶߠଷ݈݋݃ ቀఒ೙శభఒ೙ ቁ൱൩                                                                                          (4) 
 
ݏ. ݐ.
ە
ۖۖ
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖۖ
ۓܿ௠௜௡ ൑ ܿ௡ ൑ ܿ௠௔௫; ݔ௠௜௡ሺ௥ሻ ൑ ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ ൑ ݔ௠௔௫ሺ௥ሻ ; 	ߣ௠௜௡ 	൑ ߣ௡ ൑ ߣ௠௔௫
ܿଵ୼ ൑ ܿ௡ାଵܿ௡ ൑ ܿଶ୼;	ݔଵ୼
ሺ௥ሻ ൑ ݔ௡ାଵ
ሺ௥ሻ
ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ
൑ ݔଶ୼ሺ௥ሻ; ߣଵ୼ ൑
ߣ௡ାଵ
ߣ௡ ൑ ߣଶ୼
ߠଵ ൅ ߠଶ ൅ ߠଷ ൌ 1
ߝଵ ൌ log	ሺܿ୼ሻlog	ሺݔ୼ሺ௥ሻሻ
ߝଶ ൌ log	ሺܿ୼ሻlog	ሺߣଵ୼ሻ ↿ቄഊ೙శభഊ೙ வ଴ቅ൅
log	ሺܿ୼ሻ
log	ሺߣଶ୼ሻ ↿ቄഊ೙శభഊ೙ ஸ଴ቅܨ௡ ൒ 0
 
 
The next subsections describe two indicators to measure the liquidity of the 
system according to the inclusion or exclusion of the buffer fund.  
 
3.3  Liquidity indicators 
 
Two indicators emerge from our model to measure the liquidity of the 
system. The first one, which does not include the buffer fund, is defined by: 
 
																																																				ܫே௢஻ி ൌ ௖೙ௐ೙ቀ௡,௚,௫೙
ሺೝሻቁ
஻೙ቀ௡,௚,௫೙ሺೝሻ,ఒ೙ቁ
                                     (5) 
 
The second includes the buffer fund as follows: 
 
																																									ܫ஻ி ൌ
ሺଵା௃೙ሻி೙షభା௖೙ௐ೙ቀ௡,௚,௫೙ሺೝሻቁ
஻೙ቀ௡,௚,௫೙ሺೝሻ,ఒ೙ቁ
                                 (6) 
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Both indicators measure the liquidity of the system, however, in the first one, 
only the income from contributions and the expenditure of pensions are 
included, whereas, in the second one, the accumulated buffer fund is added 
to the indicator. 
 
3.4  Symmetric and asymmetric designs 
 
Our ABM also allows us to design symmetric and asymmetric cases under 
both ABMs. Palmer (2012) states that under a symmetric ABM, any surplus 
that might arise would be automatically distributed. In the absence of a 
symmetric ABM, an undistributed surplus will be maintained.  Under the 
symmetric design, the ABMs determine whether the contribution rate, the 
age of normal retirement and (indexation of pensions) are reduced 
(increased) when the system has a surplus or increased (decreased) in 
periods of deficit (Godínez-Olivares et al. 2015). Analytically, for the 
asymmetric case the change in the contribution rate and age of normal 
retirement are enforced to be strictly greater or equal to zero (strictly lower 
or equal to zero for the indexation of pensions). In other words, under the 
symmetric case, the change in the variables could be positive or negative.  
 
The following section shows the application of the ABMs to the Spanish 
pension system. 
 
 
4.  ABMs for the Spanish pension system 
 
This section presents different designs of ABMs for the Spanish pension 
system. First, the main data and assumptions are presented, secondly the 
results are discussed and finally this section provides a sensitivity analysis of 
the results. 
 
4.1 Main data and assumptions 
 
Demographic data 
 
According to the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE)16) population growth will progressively decrease over the 
next few decades. If current demographic trends continue, Spain will lose a 
more than million people (2.2%) in the next 15 years and more than 5.6 
million (12.1%) in the next 50 years, continuing the negative trend that 
                                                 
16 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, from http://www.ine.es, accessed 1 June 2015. 
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began in 2012, hence the Spanish population will be reduced to 45.8 million 
in 2024 and to 40.9 million in 2064. The reduction is mainly due to the 
progressive increase in deaths and low fertility rates. Figure 1 shows the 
population structure for years 2014, 2024 and 2034. It can be seen that the 
largest group in 2014 is aged 35-39 while the most representative group in 
2014 will be the one aged 45-49. 
 
Figure 1 –Spanish population structure. 
 
Own source based on www.ine.es 
 
The increase in life expectancy also changes the structure of the population. 
In fact, life expectancy at birth will be around 84.0 years for men and 88.7 
for women in 2030, 4 and 3 years more respectively from current values. 
Despite the decrease in the number of population and an increase in life 
expectancy, the number of deaths would continue to grow as a result of 
population ageing.  In the period 2012-2032 more than six million deaths are 
expected, around 7% higher than those observed in the previous 15 years 
(1999-2012), which results in a decrease in the value of the old-age 
dependency ratio (Figure 2). Specifically, in 20 years there will be more than 
11 million people over 64 years in Spain, that is an increase of 34%. 
 
Figure 2 – Projected old-age dependency ratio. 
Own source based on www.ine.es 
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Other main data and assumptions 
 
To set the minimisation problem, some assumptions are needed:  
 
 The entry age into the labour market, xe, is set in 2017.  
 At the beginning of the study, the decision variable contribution rate is 
assumed to be 18%, that is the weight that represents the expenditure on 
pensions over the total contributory expenditure. 
 At the beginning of the study, the decision variable retirement age is 
assumed to be 65,  that is the legal retirement age before the reform. 
 At the beginning of the study, the decision variable indexation on pensions 
is assumed to be 1%. Although pensions are usually linked to the change of 
CPI, we want to see how this variable reacts with the economic and 
demographic scenario. 
 The upper and lower bounds of the contribution rate, age of normal 
retirement and indexation of pensions are 23%, 69 and 2% and 18%, 65 and 
-2% respectively.18  
 In order to have a smooth transition, it is also assumed that the change over 
time19 in the contribution rate varies between 0.3% and 0.5%, the age of 
normal retirement between 1.5 and 3 months and the indexation of pensions 
between -2% and 2%.  
 The buffer fund is assumed to increase at an annual rate20 of 3% while the 
annual salary growth21 is 2%. 
 The salary structure is assumed to be the mean annual earnings in Spain of 
each age group 22. 
 The average net replacement rate considered in our analysis is kept23 at 
75%.  This value is higher than the replacement rate of 68.8% in the OECD-
34.  As a result of setting the replacement rate at 75%, the ratio of the 
                                                 
17 The entry age into the system does not have real implications in our model since we match the number 
of contributors and pensioners through the dependency ratio. 
18 Negative indexation would be a very unpopular and an unlikely measure to be taken in Spain. However 
some PAYG pension systems like Sweden has already adopted a negative indexation for some years to 
make its pension system solvent. For this reason, we would keep a more general setting in our model 
allowing for negative indexation with a minimum value of -2%. 
19 These values are in line with the most important reforms in the 34 OECD member countries between 
January 2009 and September 2013 (see OECD (2013)). 
20 Historical average of the Euribor in the last 15 years. 
21 We assume the expected growth of the GDP in the next 20 years according to The 2012 Ageing Report 
(2012). 
22 Eurostat Database, from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat accessed 1 June 2015. 
23 Sensitivity analysis is provided regarding this variable. 
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average pension to the average salary in 2014 becomes 60% which is in line 
with real data24.  
 
4.2  Results 
 
Figure 3 presents the optimal path for the contribution rate, age of normal 
retirement and the indexation of pensions when the buffer fund is included. 
This ABM, in contrast with the ABM without a buffer fund, accumulates the 
surpluses of the system. In both symmetric and asymmetric scenarios the 
optimal path of the decision variables is the same and the effect of the 
inclusion of the fund is seen, particularly, in the levels of the contribution 
rate, Figure 3a, and age of normal retirement, Figure 3b. The contribution 
rate stabilises at 20.5% and the age of normal retirement at 67.4. The 
indexation of pensions, Figure 3c, shows minor changes; with the inclusion 
of the buffer fund it stabilises at -0.75%. The dynamics of the fund are 
shown in Figure 3d. The accumulation period decreases over the last 5 years 
of the analysis, leaving the fund in levels near to zero as imposed in the 
restrictions.  
 
Figure 325 – Liquidity ABM with buffer fund (Black line-Symmetric. Grey line -
Asymmetric): 
 
a)Contribution 
 
 
b)Age 
 
                                                 
24  According to the OCDE (2011) the Spanish pension reform on a full career worker reduces the 
replacement rate to 73.9% (on the OECD’s standard assumptions of 2.5% price inflation and 2% real 
earnings growth).  
25 As can be seen, the optimal path is exactly the same for both scenarios. 
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c)Indexation of pensions 
 
 
d)Fund 
Own source 
 
To illustrate how the inclusion of the buffer fund contributes to the liquidity 
of the system, two liquidity indicators for the ABM with buffer fund26 are 
shown in Figure 4. The first one, Figure 4a, represent the ratio (equation 5) 
between the income from contributions and the expenditure of pensions, it is 
seen that the indicator, from year 2020 -2028, is above 1, so, the income 
from contribution does not cover the amount of pensions to be paid during 
2014-2020 and 2029-2034. However, when the fund is included in the ratio 
(equation 6), Figure 4b, the ratio is always above 1. So, the inclusion of the 
buffer fund is contributing to the liquidity of the system. 
 
Figure 427 Liquidity Indicators for the ABM with buffer fund (Black28  line-
Symmetric. Grey line- Asymmetric) 
 
a)Liquidity Indicator without buffer fund 
(Contributions/Benefits) 
 
b)Liquidity Indicator with buffer fund 
(Fund/Benefits) 
Own source 
                                                 
26 For the ABM without buffer fund is not possible to calculate these indicators, because the optimisation 
problem does not take into account the accumulation of the surpluses. 
27 As can be seen, the optimal path is exactly the same for both scenarios. 
28  Given that the optimal path for the decision variables is the same, results under symmetric and 
asymmetric scenarios are identical. 
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If we apply the liquidity ABM without including the buffer fund, the 
projections of the contribution rate, age of normal retirement and indexation 
of pensions for Spain can be seen in Figure 5. In both scenarios, the 
symmetric and asymmetric, the contribution rate, Figure 5a, increases from 
18% to 21.75%. The age of normal retirement, Figure 5b, increases to 68.8; 
1.25% and 1.4 years more respectively compared to the ABM with the 
buffer fund.  The indexation of pensions, Figure 5c, shows a small decrease 
compared to the previous ABM, in both the symmetric and asymmetric 
design, down to -1% by 2034. Figure 5d, shows that the liquidity indicator is 
always greater than 1, so, the expenditure of pensions is always covered by 
the income from contributions, as set in the liquidity restriction.  
 
Figure 5 – Liquidity ABM without buffer fund (Black line-Symmetric. Grey line-
Asymmetric). 
 
 
a)Contribution 
 
 
b)Age 
 
c)Indexation of pensions 
 
 
d)Liquidity Indicator  
Without buffer fund 
(Contributions/Benefits) 
Own source 
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
This section presents, for the ABM with buffer fund under the asymmetric 
scenario, the results of increasing or decreasing the replacement rate (RR); 
increasing or decreasing the old-age dependency ratio; and, the results when 
only one variable is projected and the other two are fixed in the current 
values.  
 
In Figure 6, two levels of replacement rates are analysed. First, we suppose a 
replacement rate of 65% (red line). Under this scenario, the contribution rate 
increases only by 1.9% to stabilise at 19.9% (0.51% less than in the base 
scenario of a replacement rate of 75%); the age of normal retirement 
increases to 66.8 (0.6 years less than in the base scenario) and the indexation 
of pensions decreases to -0.55%, that is 0.2% less compared with a 
replacement rate of 75%. When the replacement rate is set 85%, the 
contribution rate stabilises at 21.50%, the age of retirement at 68.5 and the 
indexation of pensions at -1.0% (that is, 1% and 1.1 years more, and 0.25% 
less indexation of pensions comparing with the scenario under the 
replacement rate of 75%).  
 
Something interesting in this analysis is the dynamic of the buffer fund. For 
the replacement rate of 85%, the buffer fund has surpluses at the end of the 
analysis; however, as we are imposing an asymmetric scenario, the surpluses 
cannot be redistributed by the system.  
 
Figure 6 – Liquidity ABM with buffer fund (Black dashed line - RR 85%. Grey 
line- RR 75% -base scenario-. Black points line - RR 65%) 
. 
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c)Indexation of pensions 
 
 
d)Fund 
Own source 
 
Figure 7 shows the results when different levels of the old-age dependency 
ratio (OD) are taken into account. First, a decrease of the ratio from 2.98 to 
2.8 is analysed, then an increase to 3.2 is analysed. In the first case, the 
contribution rate and indexation of pension stabilises at the same level as in 
the base scenario, but the age of retirement stabilises at 67 instead at 67.5. 
That is, basically, because the age of retirement affect both, pensioners and 
contributors. In the second case, when the old-dependency ratio starts at 3.2, 
the contribution rate increase to 21.5%, the age to 67.6 and the indexation of 
pensions -0.85%. Again, the asymmetric design is leaving the fund with 
surpluses at the end of the study when the old-dependency ratio is 2.8 in the 
first year of analysis.  
 
Figure 7 – Liquidity ABM with buffer fund (Black dashed line- OD 2.8. Grey line- 
OD 2.98 -base scenario-. Black points line - OD 3.2). 
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c)Indexation of pensions 
 
d)Fund 
Own source 
 
The ABMs proposed have the ability to modify only one variable, instead of 
modifying the three of them simultaneously. Therefore, we analyse the case 
when only one variable is studied. If we set the age of retirement and 
indexation of pensions at 65 and 1% respectively, the contribution rate 
would need to increase to 30%. If the age of retirement is the only player, 
having set the contribution rate and indexation of pensions at values 18% 
and 1% respectively, it would need to increase to 72.3. On the contrary, if 
the indexation of pensions is the only decision variable, the pension benefits 
would need to decrease by -10.3% every year. 
 
 
5. Long run analysis of the Spanish pension system 
 
In contrast, with the previous section, the model calculates the optimal path 
of the contribution rate, age of normal retirement, and indexation of pensions 
over a 75 year time horizon of. Figure 8a, presents an increase of 2.9% in the 
contribution rate comparing with the 20-year time horizon and the value 
stabilises at 23.4%. The age of retirement, Figure 8b, stabilises at 70.4, that 
is three years more than for the 20 years time horizon. The indexation of 
pensions, Figure 8c, now decreases to -1.5%, that is, double the number 
compared to the ABM over the 20 year horizon. Figure 8d, shows the 
dynamics of the buffer fund, which shows an accumulation period of almost 
40 years after which it decreases reaching the value of zero at the end of the 
75 years. 
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Figure 8 – Liquidity ABM with buffer fund (Grey line Asymmetric) in the long run 
 
 
a)Contribution 
 
b)Age 
 
c)Indexation of pensions 
 
d)Fund 
Own source 
 
Figure 9 shows the liquidity indicators defined in equation 5 (Figure 9a), and 
equation 6 (Figure 9b). The liquidity indicator without the buffer fund, 
shows a deficit in the system from 2045 onwards, in contrast to the indicator 
with the buffer fund, which does not present any deficit in the 75 years.  
 
Figure 9. Liquidity Indicators for the ABM with buffer fund (Grey line- 
Asymmetric) in the long run 
 
 
a) Liquidity Indicator without buffer fund 
(Contributions/Benefits) 
 
b) Liquidity Indicator with buffer fund 
(Fund/Benefits) 
Own source 
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Finally, if only one variable is projected at a time, the contribution rate needs 
to increase to 47% when the age of retirement and indexation of pensions are 
fixed to 65 and 1% respectively; the age of retirement needs to increase from 
65 to 79.9 if the contribution rate and indexation of pensions are fixed to 
18% and 1% respectively; and the indexation of pension needs to decrease to 
-9.2% when the contribution rate and age of normal retirement are fixed to 
18% and 65. 
6. Conclusions
Restoring the liquidity of a PAYG pension system is on the agenda for most 
governments and Spain is no exception. Even after the 2011 reform, the 
pension system’s sustainability in the long run has been widely questioned. 
This paper contributes to the debate on the policies needed to strengthen the 
pension system and proposes alternative reforms based on optimisation 
techniques to re-establish the liquidity of the Spanish PAYG pension system 
without the repeated intervention of the legislator. 
The aim of these alternative reforms, also called automatic balancing 
mechanisms (ABMs), is to guide the system back onto the road to long-term 
liquidity and at the same time to automate the measures to be taken, isolating 
them from the political arena, avoiding any delay and lack of time 
perspective.  
The ABMs can be designed in different ways considering or not in our 
analysis the amount of the accumulated buffer fund. We show that for the 
Spanish pension system the contribution rate stabilises at 20.5% and the age 
of normal retirement and indexation of pensions at 67.5 and -0.75% 
respectively after 20 years. As expected, if the amount of the buffer fund is 
not included in our analysis, the values for the contribution rate, age of 
normal retirement and indexation of pensions are higher (lower for the 
indexation of pensions) and stabilise at 21.75%, 68.8 and -1% respectively. 
The ABMs proposed have the ability to modify only one variable, instead of 
modifying the three of them simultaneously. Therefore, if the contribution 
rate is the only player into the system, it would need to increase to 30%, 
whereas if the age of retirement is the only variable it would need to increase 
to 72.3, questioning then the measures taken by Act27/2011. On the 
contrary, if the indexation of pensions is set as the only decision variable, the 
pension benefits must decrease by -10.3% every year. 
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Following some of the ideas of the current Swedish ABM we design a 
symmetric ABM that determines whether the contribution rate, the age of 
normal retirement (and indexation of pensions) are reduced (increased) when 
the system has a surplus or increased (decreased) in periods of deficit. 
Although there are some differences in the values of the variables under the 
symmetric and asymmetric design during the first years, at the end of the 
analysis both ABMs reach similar values for the contribution rate, retirement 
age and indexation of pensions. 
 
Some countries like Japan or the USA are concerned about the sustainability 
of their system in a 95 or 75-time horizon. The results for the Spanish 
pension system if a 75-year time horizon is considered are quite alarming. If 
the three decision variables are modified simultaneously, the contribution 
rate stabilises at 23.4, whereas the retirement age needs to increase to 70.4 
and the indexation on pension decreases -1.5% every year. 
 
Our paper questions the adequacy of the current reforms and considers that 
the sustainability of the Spanish pension system is not guaranteed in a long 
run, unless the structure of population changes dramatically with an increase 
in the number of contributors and a decrease in the number of pensioners. 
 
 
Appendix A: Expressions for income from contributions and 
expenditure on pensions 
 
The total contribution base for year 1 is modelled as a function of the 
individuals' average wage, wage(x) at age x, the number of people alive, 
l{x,1}, (uniformly distributed over the year),  at age x at the first year of study 
(that is, at time 1) and the entry age into the labour market, xe (for this 
particular example the entry age is 20). Thus, at time n=1, the total 
contribution base, W1, is modelled as: 
 
ଵܹ ൌ 	 ෍ ݈ሼ௫,ଵሽݓܽ݃݁ሺݔሻ
௫భሺೝሻିଵ
௫ୀ௫೐
 
 
For n>1, the total contribution base, Wn, depends additionally on variables 
such as the growth of salaries, g and the normal retirement age, ݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ. Where 
the floor function is ቔݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቕ; i.e. it maps a real number to the largest previous 
integer number, and ݉݋݀ ቔݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቕ  is the modulus operation that finds the 
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remainder of the division ݔ௡
ሺ௥ሻ
ቔݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቕ൙
. Therefore, the expression of the total 
contribution base for n greater than 1 is: 
 
௡ܹ ൌ 	
ۉ
ۇ ෍ ݈ሼ௫,௡ሽݓܽ݃݁ሺݔሻሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻ௡
ቔ௫೙ሺೝሻቕିଵ
௫ୀ௫೐ ی
ۊ
൅ ቀݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ݉݋݀ ቔݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቕቁ ݈ቄቔ௫೙ሺೝሻቕ,௡ቅݓܽ݃݁ሺቔݔ௡
ሺ௥ሻቕሻሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻ௡ 
 
The dynamics of B(n) for n>1 could be written as: 
 
ܤ௡ ൌ 	 ൬1 െ ቀݔ௡ሺ௥ሻ݉݋݀ ቔݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቕቁ ݈ቄቔ௫೙ሺೝሻቕ,௡ቅ൰ ܲቒ௫೙ሺೝሻቓ,௡ ൅ ෍ ௫ܲ,௡݈ሼ௫,௡ሽ
௪
௫ୀቒ௫೙ሺೝሻቓ
 
 
where ௫ܲ,௡ is ௫ܲ,௡ ൌ ௫ܲିଵ,௡ିଵሺ1 ൅ ߣ௡ିଵሻ, ቒݔ௡ሺ௥ሻቓ is the ceiling function, l{x,n}, 
the number of people alive at age x in time n; w the last age to which a 
person can survive, and  ߣ is the indexation of pensions that is dynamic over 
time and the expenditure on pensions at year n=1 is equal to: 
ܤଵ ൌ 	∑ ௫ܲ,ଵ݈ሼ௫,ଵሽ௪௫ୀ௫భሺೝሻ , 
 
where ܲ௫భሺೝሻ,ଵ ൌ ߙ
∑ ௟ሼೣ,భሽ௪௔௚௘ሺ௫ሻೣభ
ሺೝሻషభ
ೣసೣ೐
∑ ௟ሼೣ,భሽೣభ
ሺೝሻషభ
ೣసೣ೐
   
 
 
Appendix B: Main automatic balancing mechanisms 
 
The aim of the automatic balancing mechanisms is to reduce the growth of 
the liabilities in a pension system and adapt it to the new economic and 
demographic scenario. According to D’Addio and Whitehouse (2012) three 
main automatic mechanisms can be considered for changing pension values. 
First, adjustments can be made in benefit levels to reflect changes in life 
expectancy; second, adjustments can be made through revalorization of 
earlier years’ contribution bases and third, adjustments may occur through 
the indexation of pension payments.  
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This non-exhaustive29 appendix shows some of the main countries that have 
an ABM in place in their public pension systems. The list is sorted 
alphabetically. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of some countries with ABMs in place. 
 
Country Type ABM 
Canada (DB PAYG) Third type and increase of 
contribution rate 
If the plan is not sustainable a 
(semi-automatic) mechanism 
will increase the contribution 
rate by the amount necessary to 
cover 50% of the deficit and the 
benefits will be frozen for three 
years. 
Finland (DB PAYG) Third type Life expectancy coefficient 
adjusts the amount of pensions 
in payment. 
Germany (DB PAYG) Third type Revaluation of pensions 
includes a factor that takes into 
account the system’s rate of 
dependence. 
Japan (DB PAYG) Second and third type A modified indexation, that 
takes into account improvement 
in life expectancy and 
population changes, is applied 
to both the revaluation of the 
contribution bases and pension 
in payment 
Latvia (DC PAYG) First type Conversion from NDC capital 
to an annuity taking into 
account projected cohort life 
tables adjusted annually. 
Poland (DC PAYG) First type Conversion from NDC capital 
to an annuity taking into 
account the average life 
expectancy at retirement age. 
Portugal (DB PAYG) Third type Indexation of benefits taking 
into account improvements in 
life expectancy. 
Sweden (DC PAYG) First and second type If the system is insolvent the 
growth in pension liability (i.e. 
pension in payment and 
contributors’ notional capital) is 
reduced 
 
Source: Own source based on Vidal-Meliá et al (2009) and Godínez-Olivares et al (2015) 
 
                                                 
29 For a deep understanding see Vidal-Meliá et al (2009), Fall and Bloch (2014), Turner (2007) and 
(2009), OECD (2012) and (2013). 
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Appendix C: The Spanish pension reform 
In Spain, in order to be eligible to receive a retirement pension it is necessary 
to contribute for at least 15 years, including at least two of them in the last 
15 years prior your retirement. The table 3 shows the main differences in the 
expression to calculate the amount of the monthly initial pension, pre-reform 
(
rx
P ) and post-reform ( '
rx
P ) where: 
Wagei: is the contribution base of one individual in month i. 
rx : is the retirement age 
1S : is the monthly contribution base in month 1, that is, the month before 
retirement. 
iS : is the monthly contribution base in month i. 
Cxr ,
% : is the percentage to be applied to the base30  pension before the 
reform according to the retirement age, rx , and number of contributory 
years, C. 
)'(% ,Cxr : is the percentage to be applied to the base pension after the reform 
according to the retirement age, rx , and number of contributory years, C.  
C% : is the percentage to be applied to the base pension before the reform 
according to the total number of years of contributions (C). 
)'(%C : is the percentage to be applied to the base pension after the reform 
according to the total number of years of contributions (C). 
30 The table shows a very simplified expression of this value without considering the particularities of 
different groups. 
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The resulting pension should be higher than the minimum pension per year 
and is capped if its value exceeded the amount of the maximum pension.  
 
It is worth highlighting that before the reform, one individual who 
contributes 35 years and retires at the age 65 has a full amount of pension 
equal to the base pension. Once that the reform is totally implemented in 
2027 the individual should retire at the age 65 after 38.5 years of 
contributions or at the age of 67 after 37 contributory year to have full 
pension. 
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